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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
TRANSAMERICA
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent,
vs.
DAN ALLISON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
12265

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a &ummary judgment
entered in favor of Western Casualty and Surety
Company (hereinafter referred to as Western) and
Transamerica Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as Transamerica) declaring that defendant,
Dan Allison, and the estate of his deceased son, Rick
Lee Allison, were not entitled to coverage under automobile liability insurance policies issued by Western
and Transamerica.
1
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Motions for summary judgment were filed by
Western and Transamerica seeking a declaration of
the court that Dan Allison and the estate of his son,
Ricky Lee Allison, were not entitled to coverage for
liability arising from an automobile accident under
automobile liability policies issued by said companies. Dan Allison filed a Motion for Summary J udgment seeking a declaration that there was coverage
under both policies. The trial court granted the Motions of Western and Transamerica and denied the
Motion of Dan Allison and entered judgment accordingly.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In order to give more specific record references
and in order to supplement the facts as stated in appellant's brief, respondent Western will restate the
factual context of this appeal.
On January 2, 1968, Western issued an automobile policy to Dan Allison, the named insured. The
policy, which was in effect at the time of the accident
in question, provided insurance coverage for Mr. Allison and his f arnily for those instances specifically
contracted for in the policy.
On May 18, 1968, the appellant and James H.
Maddox, appellant's son-in-law, desired to attend a
horse show in Price, Utah. However, because it was
2
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necessary to take the vehicle normally used by Rick
Lee Allison, appellant's son, in his employment as a
dairy worker, appellant asked Mr. Maddox if Ricky
could use the Maddox jeep for that purpose. (James
Maddox deposition, p.4). Mr. Maddox consented but
expressly told both Mr. Allison and Rick that the jeep
was only to be used for the purpose of driving to the
Christiansen farm where the milking was to be performed. (James Maddox deposition, pp. 5-7). Mr.
Maddox also informed his own son, Steve, that Rick
was only to use the jeep for that specific puJtOse. (Deposition of Steve Maddox, p. 16).
Rick Allison obtained possession of the jeep
from Mr. Maddox. That evening Steve Maddox, 17
year old son of James Maddox, learned that Rick was
using the jeep to drive around the Heber-Midway
area. Because Mr. Maddox had specifically said that
he did not want Rick to use the jeep to drive around
town, Steve and a friend began searching for Rick
and the jeep. (Steve Maddox deposition p. 20). After
a fruitless search, Steve located the jeep at Heber
High School where a dance was being held. Rick was
told by Steve that he had better take the jeep back to
Rick's house until he needed it for his milking job the
following morning. Rick agreed to do this and took
the jeep, along with two girls and one boy, back to his
house. (Steve Maddox deposition p. 22). Shortly
thereafter Steve arrived at Rick's house. At this time
Rick and Steve got into an argument about the jeep's
use which finally ended in Steve taking the vehicle
3
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back to the Maddox residence. (Steve Maddox deposition pp. 24-25).
Upon arriving home Steve parked the jeep and
drove back to the high school in his own car. While
he was there he learned that the two girls with Rick
had not returned to the dance. Steve called Rick at
home and asked him if he had any way of taking the
two girls home. Rick replied that he did not have any
transportation available so Steve went home and took
the jeep back to the Allison residence. (Steve Maddox
deposition pp. 26-27). When he arrived, the two boys
apologized for their previous flareup. Steve told Rick
to ''take the girls home with it [the jeep], just don't
rod 'it and run all my gas out." (Steve Maddox deposition p. 27).
Rick Allison, Blaine Sweat, and the two girls :
then drove around in the jeep until they arrived at
the Hub Cafe and Service Station in Heber City. It
was here that they met Craig Fuhriman and David '
Lund. Mr. Fuhriman and Lund told Rick that they
had run out of gas and asked if Rick would help them.
Upon being asked where the car was, Mr. Fuhriman
replied, "It's about 20 miles back up the canyon."
(Craig Fuhriman deposition pp. 14-15). The boys
left, took the girls home, and returned back to the
service station.
Although the service station did not have a gas
can, it apparently did have a siphoning hose. They ,
drove to the area where the car was stranded, found '
4
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a service station nearby, and awakened the attendant. Upon learning that the station did not have a
gas can, Mr. Fuhriman purchased two dollars worth
of gas for the jeep. (Craig Fuhriman deposition p.
17) . The parties then proceeded westbound past the
stalled automobile, made a "U" turn and parked parallel to the Fuhriman vehicle. Thus, the stalled car
was facing west and was about 3 feet from the edge
of the road while the jeep was facing east adjacent
to the car. (Craig Fuhriman deposition p. 19-20).
At this time the emergency flashers of the jeep as
well as the headlights were in operation. No lights
of the stalled vehicle were on. Rick attempted to siphon, but got a full mouth of gasoline. While Rick
was trying to clear the gasoline from his throat,
Blaine Sweat undertook the siphoning. (Craig Fuhriman deposition p. 25). It was at this time that Mr.
Fuhriman saw an oncoming car and shouted a warning to the two boys. Before the boys could escape, a
car driven by Harold Sergent crashed into the stalled
car. (Craig Fuhriman deposition pp. 29-30). Mr.
Fuhriman, although being hit by some flying object,
managed to get up to assist the injured. Shortly thereafter, another car approached, but instead of stopping, crashed squarely into the Maddox jeep. None of
the victims of the first accident were harmed by this
second accident, however. (Craig Fuhriman deposition p. 36). As a result of the first accident Rick Allison was instantly killed and Blaine Sweat was fatally
injured.
5
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Following the accident, several separate actions
were brought as noted in appellant's brief. This Court
has already decided one such action in Sweat vs.
Fuhriman, 23 Utah 2d 331, 463 P.2d 3 (1969). As
also noted, Wes tern and Transamerica have consistently refused to defend Dan Allison and the estate
of his deceased son in any of these actions because of ,
no coverage.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE THE MADDOX JE'EP WAS NOT
USED uwITH THE EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
PERMISSION OF THE OWNER" AS REQUIRED BY WESTERN'S POLICY, RICK LEE ALLISON AND HIS ESTATE ARE NOT "INSUREDS" UNDER THE TERMS OF THE POLICY
.A:ND DAN ALLISON IS NOT PROTECTED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE POLICY.

There is no dispute that Rick Lee Allison was
potentially an "insured" under the Wes tern policy.
The applicable policy provisions are:
V. USE OF OTHER AUTOMOBILE: If the
named insured is an individual or individual
and spouse and if dur ing the policy period such
named insured or spouse owns a private passenger automobile covered by this policy, such
insurance as is afforded by this policy under
Coverages A, B, and Division 1 of Coverage C
with respect to said automobile applies with
respect to any other automobile, subject to the
following provision:
1

***

6
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( d) This insuring agreement does not apply
to any automobile:
(1) * * *

(2) Used without the express or implied
permission of the owner.
It is Western's position that the facts of this case
show that no such permission was ever given to Rick
Allison.
The appellant argues that because the Western
policy did not contain the words "and is within the
scope of such permission," that the matter of ''scope"
should not be taken into account by a court in determining ~'permission." Western contends that these
additional words are not necessary in an insuring
agreement since the word ''permission" necessarily
includes '''scope." This contention is supported by numerous cases throughout the country. In Collins vs.
New York Casualty Co., 82 S.E.2d 288 (W. Virg.
1954) a similar argument was made. In this case the
owner of the car had loaned it to a friend who said
that he was going to town to collect a debt. The car
was given with the understanding that it would be
returned within an hour after the debt had been collected. However, the friend could not find the debtor
and instead went to a tavern where he became drunk,
met a friend, and was later involved in an accident
more than five and a half hours after he had first
borrowed the car. The "friend" contended he was
covered under the owner's policy because "the actual
use of the automobile [was] with the permission of
7
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the named insured." The court rejected this argument. It said:
The words "with the permission of the insured," in our opinion, are controlling. Certainly the word "permission" of itself has a
definite meaning. It has been defined in Black's
Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1298, as "a
license to do a thing; an authority to do an act
which, without such authority, would have
been unlawful;" and in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, 1824, the word is defined as an "act
of permitting; formal consent; authorization;
leave; license or liberty granted." The very definition of the word ''permission" implies its
application variously to the things permitted
to be done by the person granting the permission, so that inherently the words '''with the
permission of the insured" in the omnibus
clause of the instant policy suggests that the '
scope of the permission is that which the parties intended." Id at 297 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Continental Casualty Co. vs. Padgett, 219 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1955) that court was
confronted with the interpretation of a policy which
provided coverage when "the actual use of the automobile is by the named assured, or with his permission." In this case an employee was told by his employer that he could use company truck to transport
wood to his mother's house if he would bring the truck
back to the business. After performing the chore, the
employee used the truck for his own social purposes
at which time he was involved in an accident. The
court rejected the argument that the accident occur1

8
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red while the truck was being used with the owner's
permission. It said :
The language of the omnibus clause,
which brings within the coverage of the policy
any one who uses the insured vehicle with the
permission of the assured, is clear enough.
Equally clear is the undisputed testimony that
Taylor was given permission to use the car
[truck] for a specific purpose for his own convenience after business hours ... [HJ e violated his instructions, removed the car from the
parking place and made use of it, not in the
business of his employer but for the pleasure
of himself and his friends. It is plain, unless
the words of the contract are distorted from
their clear and normal meaning, that the fatal
ride was not made with the permission of the
insured within the meaning of the policy. Id.
at 135.
In Long vs. Superior Insiirance Co., 230 F.2d
507 (10th Cir. 1956) the Court of Appeals affirmed
a lower court decision holding that an omnibus clause
of an insurance policy [covering any person while
using the automobile ... provided the actual use of
the automobile is by the named insured or with his
permission] did not cover the brother of the named
insured who was given permission to go to the city
dump and deliver trash with the insured truck but
who used the truck for a pleasure trip of his own. The
court concluded:
There would seem to be ample evidence to
support the trial court's conclusion that this
pleasure trip was outside the scope of the permissive use of the vehicle ... Id. at 510.
9
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In Travelers Insurance Co. vs. Kinney, 238 F.
Supp. 652 ( D. Mo. 1964) the question of "permission" once again arose. The permittee, in 'th'is case,
was given permission to use the owner's car for a
limited purpose but was instructed to return it after
such use. When the permittee went to the home of the
owner to give the car back, the owner was n'ot at ,
home. Instead of leaving the car as instructed, he took
the car and was involved in an accident while on a
personal trip of his own. The court said :
Nowhere does the record reveal that Shumake expressly or impliedly by any language
or conduct, conferred permission on Kinney to
use the car after returning it on Christmas
morning. Quite to the contrary, Kinney had
specific permission and instructions only to
use it to drive h'ome on the evening of the 24th
and to return it that next morning.
Therefore, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that Kinney was not using the car
with the permission of a named insured under
the policy at the time of the accident in question and therefore was not a permissive user
within the terms of plaintiff's policy. Id at 653.
Finally, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Ditmyer vs. American Liberty Insurance Co., 160 S.E.
2d 844, 117 Geo. App. 512, ( 1968) faced a similar
"permission" problem. After the court found that the
permittee was only given limited permission, but had
deviated from this permission for his own personal
use, the court said :
In the majority of the jurisdictions it is
10
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held, as here, that while a slight or inconsequential deviation from the permission given
will not annul the coverage of the omnibus
clause, there is an absence of permission within the meaning of the policy if the vehicle is
being driven at a time or a place or for a purpose not authorized by the insured. For a collection and discussion !of the cases and the
varying rules see 72 A.L.R. 1398-1409; 106
A.L.R. 1259-1263; 5 A.L.R. 2d 594-668. Id. at
850 (emphasis added).
See also Savage vs. American Mutual Liability
Ins. Co., 182 A.2d 669, 158 Me. 259, (1962); Willimns vs. Travelers Ins. Co., 265 F.2d 531 (4th Cir.
1959) ; Laroche vs. Farm Bureau Mutual Auto Ins.
Co., 7 A.2d 361 ( 1939) ; Caldwell vs. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 98 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1938).
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that

the ~'scope" of permission is an important factor in
determining whether there had been "permission" at
the time of an accident. It seems equally apparent
that in the case at bar Rick Allison was not within
the permission given to him by James Maddox. This
can be seen by reviewing the applicable depositions.
Q.

Okay. Now, Ricky was home, you were on
the phone - on the telephone at the Ford
Motor Company and you talked to Ricky?
A. Right.
Q. What did you say?
A. I told him he could use the jeep to milk his
cows and go back and forth to Christiansens.
11
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Q.
A.

Okay. Did you say anything else?
Yes. I told him I didn't want him driving
around anyplace else.
(James Maddox deposition, p. 5, Ins.
11-19)
* * * * * *

Q.
A.

Q.

Okay. Now, when did you next see Ricky?
My wife and I rode up to his house. This
was right after lunch. And Ricky was
standing in front of his house with another boy. But - I don't know the Sweat boy,
but my wife said it wasn't him - said it
was another boy. She knows him. And she
was with me when we told him, you know,
explained to Ricky again that we didn't
want him to take the jeep anyplace except
to milk.
(James Maddox deposition p. 6, Ins. 3-9).
* * * * * *

Do you know when arrangements were
made by Ricky to be allowed to use the
jeep?
A. Yes. My dad told him he could use it to go
to milk and back and nothing else. And I
can remember this particularly because
one of the reasons he wouldn't let me take
the jeep that night was because he didn't
want it running up and down Main Street
all night long.
(Steven Maddox deposition, p. 15, Ins.
9-15).
Thus, James Maddox specifically gave Rick Al12
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lison permission to use the jeep only for transportation to his milking job. When Rick used the jeep to
joy ride in town, he had gone beyond the scope of that
perm1ss10n.
POINT II
STEVEN MADDOX HAD NO AUTHORITY TO
GIVE RICK ALLISON PERMISSION TO USE
THE JEEP.

The fact that Steven Maddox later allowed Rick
to take the jeep for the purpose of taking the girls
home had no effect on the initial permission. Steven
had no authority to change or modify his father's express pern11ss10n.
I don't believe that I have the authorityI don't believe
that I could lend the jeep to anybody I wanted
to just on the spur of the moment. It wasn't
mine. I had to have permission everytime I took
it myself, let alone let anybody else drive it. In
fact, I wasn't even sure I had permission to
go take it that night - the first time. (Steven
Maddox deposition, p. 10, Ins. 5-11).
For cases holding that the first permittee has
no authority to delegate the use of the automobile to
another or to enlarge the permission given by the
owner to the first permittee, see Norris vs. Pacific
Indemnity Co., 39 Cal.2d 420, 247 P.2d 1 (1952);
H elnikamp vs. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.,
407 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Appeals 1966); Civil Service
Employees Ins. Co. vs. Roberts, 10 Ariz. App. 512,
460 P.2d 48 (1969); Jones vs. Indiana Lumbermen's
! just gave it to him. I never -

13
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Mutual Ins. Co., 161 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1964); Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America vs. Sanders, 169
Okla. 378, 36 P.2d 271 (1934); Grange Insurance
Association vs. Eschback, 1 Wash. App. 230, 460 P.2d
690 (1969), and Hamm vs. Camerota, 48 Wash.2d
34, 290 P.2d 713 (1955).
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that
Steven did have the power to change the permission,
Rick Allison exceeded that permission as well as the
permission of James Maddox. At the time Steven
gave the jeep back to Dan he told him, "Take the
girls home with it." (Steven Maddox deposition, p.
27, In. 10). At the time the accident occurred Rick
had taken the girls home and was "approximately 25
miles east of Heber City." (Apellant's Brief at 4).
Thus, the location of the accident was clearly beyond
the scope of permission given to Rick by Mr. Maddox
since the initial permission only included a distance
of one mile. (Steven Maddox deposition, p. 18, In. 1).
Of course, the permission had also been exceeded in
regard to time. Rick's job did not begin until 5 :00
a.m. the morning of May 19, 1968 (Dan Allison deposition, p. 20) and yet the accident occurred approximately at 1 :20 a.m. that morning (Trooper Joseph Giles deposition, p. 6, Ins. 12-19).
Because the accident in question occurred outside the scope of permission given to Rick Allison by
Jam es Maddox, Wes tern had no obligation to defend
the estate of Rick Allison against any claims brought
against it. Likewise, Wes tern had no obligation to de14
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fend Dan Allison for any claims brought against him.
Before liability can be imputed to Mr. Allison under
the terms of the policy, the condition of "express or
implied permission of the owner" must be met by the
permittee. Because this condition was not met by
Rick Allison, the policy cannot be extended to cover
Dan Allison. The cases cited by appellant are readily
distinguishable since in each instance there was no
question that the permittee was within the permission granted to him. (See Appellant's Brief a:t 18).
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE PERMISSION REQUIRED IS JUSTIFIED
BY THE LANGUAGE IN THE INSURANCE
POLICIES AND AGREES WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS.

The appellant argues that requiring "scope of
permission" to be read into "permission" serves no
useful purpose "except to enhance the coffers of the
insurance company." (Appellant's Brief at 19). The
courts have held that this interpretation serves a
very useful purpose.
In these days when reduced premiums are
being offered to those who maintain a low level
of accident liability, the abiilty of the insured
owner to impose effective restrictions on permitted use by another becomes important to
the insured as well as to the insurer. Savage
vs. American Miitiwl Liability Ins. Co., 182
A.2d 669, 671 (Maine 1962).
In addition, the "scope" requirement makes an owner
15
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more careful as to who he will lend his car to. If an
owner knows that a permittee is likely to go beyond
the scope of permission which he gives him, the owner is much less likely to entrust the car to this permittee if he knows that the insurance will not cover
any accident which occurs outside the "scope.-'' It is
highly probable that most car owners equate "permission" and "scope" together when they loan their
car to a permittee. If, for example, a car owner is
asked by a police officer whether a permittee had
permission to use his car at a particular time or
place, the owner must automatically think of both
deviation in time and distance in arriving at his answer. When a permittee goes beyond his permission,
he has gone beyond the desire of the owner to protect
him.
The appellant also argues that Rick Allison
should have been allowed to deviate from his permission because of an "emergency." Examples are proposed where a permittee comes upon the scene of a
serious accident or upon stranded accident victims.
A deviation from the scope of permission in such
cases could perhaps be justified. However, in the case
at bar we are not confronted with an "emergency."
Rather, we are confronted with a situation where
two boys take a jeep they should not have had at the
time, use it for purposes completely contrary to the
wishes of the owner, and take it upon themselves to
assist strange motorists who have run out of gas
some 25 miles away. In such a case it can hardly be
16
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said that an ~'emergency" existed which justified a
deviation from the permissive use.
CONCLUSION

Because Rick Allison did not have the "express
or implied permission of the owner" to use the jeep
at the time of the accident, there was no coverage under Western's policy for appellant or the estate of his
deceased son. For this reason the judgment of the
lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI

GLENN C. HANNI
Attorney for Respondent,
Western Casulty and
Surety Company
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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